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A B S T R A C T
The Bureau of Meteorology has a mandate to issue warnings for weather and climate events that are likely to
result in harm and loss. This service has been delivered in an end-to-end (science to service) context and
warnings messages have typically been crafted to describe the current and predicted future state of the en-
vironment and recommended protective actions. However, the warnings landscape is evolving and Australian
governments and emergency management agencies are adopting rapidly diversifying roles in a range of warnings
processes. This evolution coincides with the shift in international strategies: from the mitigation and crisis
management approach to the emphasis on building community resilience. Following a number of severe
weather-related events that resulted in serious losses a series of Australian inquiries, reviews and social research
investigated warnings efficacy. This included the National Review of Warnings and Information for Australia,
with a recommendation suggesting that a Total Warning System concept be more formally considered across
multiple hazards, rather than just flood, as it currently stands. Consequently, Australian warnings agencies are
embracing a more people-centred approach recognising the need for messages to include detail of likely impact
alongside an implied level of risk. Thus, developing capability to deliver impact forecasting and risk-based
warnings services in a multi (natural) hazard context. With a key focus on flood, fire and tropical cyclone, this
paper reviews international and national warnings policy documents and social research and explores the evi-
dence-based evolution of warning services with respect to the Total Warning System concept.
1. Introduction
There have been significant advances to Australia's hazard warning
systems which can be conceptualised as a transition from a crisis re-
sponse model to one of community preparedness, disaster mitigation
and more recently, disaster risk reduction (DRR) [99]. National and
international events (Fig. 1) and, associated social research has driven
this change by critically highlighting the need to: communicate
warning messages in terms of likely impact, enhance awareness of risk
and uncertainty and, increase preparedness prior to an emergency. The
central goal of this change is to improve public risk-based decision
making in response to emergency warnings [40,98,99]. To achieve this,
the National Review of Warnings and Information for Australia
considers:
‘There is merit in the ‘total warning system’ concept, already
adopted by flood response agencies, being more formally considered
across other hazards in the development of future warning frame-
works ([40]; p.10).’
The Total Flood Warning System (Fig. 2) is uniquely the only for-
mally documented Total Warning System in Australia. Manual 21 [5]
describes the Total Warning System concept as broadly about dis-
covering and applying the best hazard related science and technology to
understand and describe the current and predicted future state of the
environment as it relates to a specific threat. This system supports the
Bureau of Meteorology (the Bureau), who is responsible for monitoring
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and prediction, in issuing timely flood warnings at serviced locations1
for many of the flood prone communities across Australia. Bureau
warnings are then interpreted by responsible warning agencies, sup-
plemented with additional impact information and recommended pre-
cautionary actions. Additional warnings are then communicated by
these agencies via any and all appropriate channels, in relevant formats,
to end users [5]. Agencies aim to ensure end users receive timely flood
warnings that are understood and trusted to assist people make timely
decisions to support their safety and wellbeing. Post event reviews are
then recommended to assess the warning products efficacy, and ele-
ments of the Total Flood Warning System to ensure continual im-
provement of the system [5].
However, recent post event reviews following significant events in
Australia have highlighted failures within the warning systems, not just
for flood, but also for other hazards, such as bushfire and tropical cy-
clone. This paper considers these deficiencies and explores how the
Total Warning System concept might be achieved across all hazards. In
doing so, this paper enhances our understanding of the critical factors
that need to be considered when developing future impact forecast and
risk-based warning systems and thus, will guide improvements to cur-
rent systems.
First, this paper captures the evolution towards impact forecast and
risk-based warning systems with respect to a Total Warning System
concept, by exploring the warnings landscape in Australia in con-
sideration of recent key international strategies and national policy
developments. To further highlight the drive towards the Total Warning
System concept and elements that require greater focus, the next sec-
tions consider the complexities of flood, fire and tropical cyclone
warnings in relation to learnings from specific Australian events over
the past decades. Based on this analysis, the paper presents the critical
components of a Total Warning System and considers where impact and
risk information should be incorporated. The paper concludes with
mention of various initiatives, by and for Australian warning agencies
that will contribute to the transition to impact forecast and risk-based
warning systems and the potential for adoption of a Total Warning
System concept across all hazards.
The applied research method for this study has taken place through
a review of international and national warnings policy documents and
the social research across multiple hazards, with a key focus on flood,
fire and tropical cyclone. After heatwaves, these three hazards are the
most deadly [31] in Australia and the inherent uncertainties in fore-
casting and warning, compound the challenges of effective commu-
nication.
National weather services world wide, together with their partners
in emergency management and national governments, are transitioning
towards developing impact forecasting and risk based warnings sys-
tems. The World Meteorological Organisation supports and promotes
this move. While most of the findings and learnings arising from the
Fig. 1. Warnings landscape in Australia, significant national and international events and influences since 1989.
1 Serviced locations exist for most rivers in Australia, which have flood warning in-
frastructure installed (including rainfall and river height gauges), to support issuing of
predictive flood warnings aligned to predetermined flood class levels [25].
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various case studies throughout this paper are relevant internationally
the focus of the discussion below is the Australian context.
2. The warnings landscape in Australia
To provide insight into the development of the warnings landscape
in Australia, this section begins broadly by identifying key international
strategies that Australia has helped influence, and has been influenced
by. The following section describes developments in various national
policies that have contributed to the evolution of warnings across the
nation.
2.1. Key international strategies
The International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR)
from 1990 to 2000 resulted in a rich body of literature on the topic of
early warning systems which emphasised the need to shift away from a
‘crisis and contingency’ approach to that of DRR through all stages of
the risk management process [44,57]. During and following the IDNDR,
several global strategies were produced including the Hyogo Framework
for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities
to Disasters (2005). This framework emphasised the implementation of
‘people-centred’ early warning systems as of key importance for sup-
porting ‘…effective operations by disaster managers and other decision
makers’ [89, p.9].
More recently, governments and delegations attending the 2015 UN
World Conference in Sendai, Japan declared the Sendai Framework for
DRR 2015–2030 as a leading plan for reducing loss from disasters and
building community resilience globally. The plan (global target number
seven) expresses a need to increase availability and accessibility of
disaster risk information through Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems,
[90, p.12]. Australia has been an active participant in these global in-
itiatives including national efforts to tangibly transform warning and
disaster management practices into effective DRR models which are in
line with the Sendai framework [2].
Shortly after the 2015 Sendai conference, the World Meteorological
Organisation (WMO) released guidelines to assist meteorological ser-
vices to take a more people-centred approach, recommending a shift to
impact-based forecasts and risk-informed warnings [98]. The WMO
advocate that, in addition to well-forecasted events and accurate
warnings, services need to communicate what the impact of a hazard
(or multiple hazards) might be to an individual or community at risk.
This means replacing forecasts and warnings that state hazard only e.g.,
‘wind gusts of over 100 km per hour (kmph) expected’, with ones that
incorporate impact e.g., ‘severe thunderstorms with wind gusts over
100 kmph likely to result in damage to trees and power lines’ [98, p.6].
The guidelines acknowledge the need for disaster impact forecasts and
risk-based information because, while stakeholders, individuals and
communities may realise ‘what the weather might be, there is a fre-
quent misunderstanding about what the weather might do’ [98, p.2].
The WMO also highlights the critical importance of partnerships
between stakeholders and the public, especially in situations where
emergency services are mandated with issuing community warnings
that include local information about impact and exposure e.g., ‘ex-
tensive traffic delays in Kensington may occur due to the risk of large
trees downing power lines and blocking roads as a result of severe
thunderstorms’ [98, p.14]. They also outline the need to address in-
herent forecast uncertainty, and its link to exposure and vulnerability in
order to quantify risk associated to the likely impact of weather [98].
2.2. National policy developments
Coincident with these international strategies, the Australian and
New Zealand Emergency Management Committee (ANZEMC) initiated
a National Review of Warnings and Information (herein called 'the
Review; [40]) in response to the 2009 Bushfire Royal Commission and
other inquiries following the 2010–11 Queensland and Victorian Floods
and Severe Tropical Cyclones Larry and Yasi in 2006 and 2011, re-
spectively. The Review was conducted in the context of warnings being
an integral component of emergency management and effective hazard
warnings processes being essential to building community disaster re-
silience [40].
The Review was a 'landmark' in that for the first time it provided an
opportunity to rigorously investigate how warnings and information
were provided across a multi-hazard, national sphere. The findings of
the Review were widely regarded and endorsed by the Steering
Committee, together with key decision makers. For example, the
Australasian Fire and Emergency Services Authorities Council (AFAC)
endorsed the establishment of a National Working Group for Public
Information and Warnings to consider the warnings environment holi-
stically and explore strengths, challenges, opportunities and good
practice [3].
In scoping the Review, representatives from across the emergency
management sector agreed that both warnings about hazards (such as
those provided by the Bureau) and warnings about potential impact of
an incident (such as those typically provided by emergency services and
other statutory authorities), should be considered [40]. The fact that a
distinction between the two is articulated is interesting on many levels
for the Bureau and emergency services, and from a community per-
spective. Firstly, it demonstrates a lack of shared understanding among
stakeholders of what a ‘warning’ is and, more importantly, it implies in
the review, that for completeness, a national warnings capability needs
to include information about the hazard and the potential impact.
However, the Review does not go into detail on how this might be
achieved or why this is important. Further, based on this assumption, it
could reasonably be concluded that a partnership between weather
services, emergency services, statutory authorities and diverse and at-
risk communities is essential to build this capability [45].
From the Bureau's perspective, the primary purpose of warnings is
to provide adequate information about an impending (hazard related)
peril to enable defensive action. From the emergency services'
Fig. 2. The components of the Total Flood Warning System (TFWS) [5].
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perspective, response agencies are best placed to provide warnings
about the likely impact of the hazard to communities in an effort to
enhance preparedness and reduce harm. This is true for all hazards
across all levels of social aggregation and time scales. This is a re-
sponsibility that is defined in legislation and through arrangements that
are unique to each state and territory [6]. These arrangements are
pursued in operations through multi-hazard early warning systems
[99].
The Review calls for greater consistency in the development of
warnings frameworks across jurisdictions and across all hazards, with
frameworks remaining flexible enough to accommodate the nuances in
warning for the various hazards experienced in Australia. Therefore,
the need for evidence-based change is highlighted to ensure that the
tailored and targeted information needs of communities are not com-
promised with the merging of warnings frameworks and protocols.
Further, with the call for agencies to formally consider using the Total
Warning System concept in the development of future warning frame-
works, the Review draws an explicit connection between community
preparedness and how it influences effective response to warnings.
Interestingly, the Total Flood Warning System, as it is currently de-
scribed within Manual 21 [5], does not incorporate community pre-
paredness as a key element. Instead, Manual 21 limits recommenda-
tions to engagement of key community members or groups to inform all
stages of the Total Flood Warning System and focuses on community
education campaigns.
3. The complexities of warnings in Australia
To provide greater context to the developments in national policies
of the past decades, the following section reviews the complexities of
flood, bushfire and tropical cyclone warnings with reference to social
research that has informed the abovementioned inquiries.
3.1. Flood
Australia is commonly known to be the driest inhabited continent
on earth [94]. What is less well known is that floods are the second
most deadly hazard in Australia, following heatwave [31], and the most
expensive hazard for the Australian community [91]. It may be argued
that many Australians do not consider flooding to be a significant threat
to life, demonstrated by risk taking behaviour such as driving through
and recreating in floodwater, which has had disastrous consequences
[51].
As the population of Australia continues to grow and diversify,
housing expands further across floodplains. Also enhancing the popu-
lations’ vulnerability is the impact of climate change with the IPCC [56]
predicting an increase in the frequency and severity of floods. Given
these factors, it is imperative that the community receives high quality
flood warnings that are community centric, and are designed to over-
come barriers to effective communication of warnings and motivate
protective action [45].
Many flood prone communities around Australia are supported by
the Total Flood Warning System (see Fig. 2) [5], where warnings pro-
ducts detailing the hazard and associated risk are triggered by real-time
and predicted flood heights. Relevant government agencies in each
State and Territory enhance existing warnings with information about
the likely impact and recommended protective action to engender ef-
fective decision-making by the community. The process is completed
with a review of the Total Flood Warning System or components of it to
identify any failings and areas for improvement [15,5].
Post event reviews in Australia have contributed to the continual
evolution of the Total Flood Warning System since the first publication
of practitioner guidelines in 1995. Most noteworthy are the inquiries
and social research that was undertaken after the Queensland and
Victorian floods in 2010–11. In Queensland, flooding resulted in 33
confirmed deaths and ‘over 78% of the State declared a disaster zone
[76]’. In Victoria, over one third of the State was affected, with record
flood levels being recorded in many communities [32]. Post event re-
views of these events identified failings with respect to flood warning
dissemination, timeliness, accessibility and tailoring of warnings to
meet community needs alongside recommendations on how to address
these issues [32,76].
Risk perception as an influencer of warning recipient's response
[45] was highlighted as a gap in both Queensland and Victoria due to
potential lack of education and engagement of the community with
respect to their flood risk [32,76]. Canterford et al. [28] found risk
perception was a key determinant of the community's ability to respond
to warnings, where ‘10% [of respondents] heard a warning but thought it
was not relevant to them [28, p.2]’. While it is acknowledged that there
are a broad range of factors that may influence a recipient's response to
warnings [36,45,71,72,74], these findings support social research that
has shown risk perception can act as a barrier to warning messages
being accepted, understood and personalised (e.g. [71]). These are
critical components of the highly complex and nuanced decision
making process during emergencies [62,78,79].
Interestingly, social media was accessed as a reliable source for
personalised information during the 2010–11 events. Through Twitter
and various community-run Facebook groups, users posted official
warning information from trusted sources complemented with more
personalised, local information crowdsourced from other users, e.g.
real-time updates of road closures [27,8]. The fact that this occurred
highlighted that the public questioned the relevancy of official warn-
ings in terms of providing the most current and useful information. In
some instances, timely official information was lacking and when it was
received, it often did not meet users’ needs [9]. Despite potential risks
associated with the quality of information on social media, users self-
moderated warning information to ensure that only the most up-to-date
and accurate information was shared [27,8]. This demonstrates a high
degree of social capital in affected communities, which, if harnessed
respectfully, can provide practitioners with an opportunity to mean-
ingfully engage across community networks to build flood resilience
through preparedness activities [37].
Greater focus on community education with respect to flood risk
and greater engagement of the community to inform the development
of tailored warnings to meet community needs were common re-
commendations of post event reviews in both states [32,76]. While a
number of community education activities such as the FloodSafe2
program, continue to evolve since the 2010–11 floods, the emergency
services have been embracing a greater understanding and appreciation
of the importance of community engagement in flood planning and
preparedness. This forms part of a broader sector wide shift with a
greater emphasis of emergency service volunteer roles in community
engagement activities, evidenced by various initiatives, including the
Community Engagement Forums in Victoria [92]. It is critical, however,
that the importance of community engagement is recognised and the
processes of engagement are adequately resourced to ensure its effec-
tiveness in enhancing community flood resilience [41,93].
Despite these efforts, similar failures in the dissemination of warn-
ings and public compliance to them were identified in northern New
South Wales following floods resulting from ex-Tropical Cyclone Debbie
in March 2017. Underlying and recurrent themes emanating from post-
impact surveying were the need for locally specific information and the
requirement to tap into local knowledge and expertise to inform
warnings messages – all of which can be accomplished through effective
community engagement. Other points of note included:
• The timing of evacuation warnings and orders was an important issue, as
many received these warnings after roads were already flooded.
• Some felt that evacuation orders were too ‘bossy’ and ‘panicky’ –
2 See, for example: https://www.ses.vic.gov.au/get-ready/floodsafe.
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particularly in a context where residents were already ‘flooded in’ and a
culture of sheltering exists [88, p.93].’
These points further highlight the need to personalise and ensure
the relevance of warnings with respect to the local context. Given the
large number of flood fatalities in Australia associated with driving
[51], this also extends to specific warnings for motorists. During
flooding in New South Wales in 2015, Gissing et al. [42] observed that
the vast majority of motorists (84% of 154) ignored warning signs,
instead choosing to drive through floodwater.
Despite these failings, progress has been made by the sector to
better understand how to effectively design and implement the Total
Flood Warning System including a greater appreciation of how to ef-
fectively design flood warnings. Further improvements are anticipated
with the very recent publication of ‘Developing Total Flood Warning
Systems’, which builds on Manual 21 by providing detailed guidance on
the system, but uniquely focuses heavily on elements of successful
warning systems and how to meet the needs of the community [38].
Further research is underway with the objective of generating practical
guidance to reduce message non-compliance by examining message
comprehension and methods for personalising warning messages [87].
A key challenge for emergency services will be to effectively tailor
catchment-based scale flood warnings, supported by the Total Flood
Warning System, to meet the needs of such a diversifying population.
This will likely require a change in practice, potentially through more
effective use of communication channels such as social media. The
emergency services will also need to remain cognisant of the fact that
often the best channels for communicating tailored flood warnings
commonly occur when warning information is delivered by family,
friends or neighbours [26,28].
3.2. Bushfire
Australia is one of the most bushfire-prone countries in the world.
After heatwaves, tropical cyclones and floods, bushfires are the fourth
most deadly natural hazard in Australia with 825 fatalities recorded
between 1901 and 2011 [12]. Globally between 1978 and 2013, the
length of the fire season increased almost 19% reducing opportunities
for planned fire risk reduction burning and intensifying pressure on fire
fighting resources [53]. In Australia, conditions conducive to harsh fire
weather are becoming more frequent which will very likely lead to an
increased number of days with extreme fire danger [29], particularly in
southern and eastern Australia [34]. Further exacerbating Australia's
vulnerability is the growing encroachment of populations in bushfire-
prone areas [33,49].
Each Australian state and territory has its own fire authorities, fire
advisory practices and procedures. Each bushfire warning system is
informed by a Fire Danger Rating system which uses several Fire
Danger Indices (FDI), as forecast by the Bureau's data for air tempera-
ture, relative humidity, wind speed and drought conditions [20]. Other
risk factors such as current fires and local conditions – vegetation and
topography – also contribute to the determination of the Fire Danger
Ratings.
Prior to 2009, the Fire Danger Rating system typically consisted of:
low, moderate, high, very high, and extreme. Also prior to 2009, one of
the keystones of the bushfire policy advice was "Prepare, stay and de-
fend, or leave early". However, this policy, and the rationale behind it,
was critically contested by the February 2009 Victorian Black Saturday
bushfires. The accuracy and quality of bushfire warning systems was
consequently put under scrutiny during the 2009 Victorian Bushfires
Royal Commission.
While many people effectively stayed and defended their properties
or successfully evacuated when threatened, 173 people perished in the
Black Saturday bushfires. Whittaker et al. [96] found that many people
were not adequately prepared to ‘stay and defend’ while others waited
to take action until the threat was upon them, resulting in late
evacuation, defending ill-prepared or undertaking passive shelter.
Based on an analysis of fatality data from 1900 to 2008 (i.e. prior to
Black Saturday), Haynes et al. [47] highlighted the inherent complex-
ities of the ‘stay and defend or leave early’ policy in terms of the am-
biguity surrounding ‘leave early’. Haynes et al. [47] suggest that people
interpreted ‘stay and defend or leave early’ as wait until it seems dan-
gerous and then evacuate. Tibbits & Whittaker [86] also identified is-
sues of misinterpretations of the ‘stay and defend or leave early’ policy
during the 2003 Victorian bushfires, with people consciously or un-
consciously creating a Plan B of late evacuation when staying and de-
fending was untenable.
This ‘wait and see’ approach was certainly prevalent during the
2009 Black Saturday bushfires with people waiting to see how bad the
fires were, waiting until they were under direct threat or waiting for
advice from the emergency services [66,95]. McLennan et al. [66]
found that people's indecisiveness around when to evacuate was a result
of the uncertainty about the severity and proximity of the fires with
many people waiting for an external trigger to spark decisive action.
That is, people responded when the threat was imminent [67,96].
Whittaker et al. [97] therefore postulate that emergency warnings need
to provide more clear and detailed action advice for people that have
limited awareness and understanding of bushfire risk.
The 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (the Commission)
concluded that while the ‘central tenets of the stay or go policy remain
sound these fires ‘severely test the policy and exposed weaknesses in the
way it was applied’ [85, p.5]. The Commission also clarified ‘Leaving
early is still the safest option’. Staying to defend a well-prepared, de-
fendable home is also a sound choice in less severe fires, but there needs
to be greater emphasis on important qualifications’ [85, p.5]. For ex-
ample, McLennan et al. [68] found that people living in bushfire prone
areas are unlikely to accept that the safest plan is to leave early well
before a bushfire is imminent due to a strong desire to stay and defend.
McLennan et al. therefore recommend ‘(a) motivating householders
intending to stay and defend to undertake systematic risk assessments
of their specific property and family member circumstances if threa-
tened by bushfire under a range of fire danger weather conditions; and
(b) informing them of the requirements for safe and effective defence
under these different threat levels’ (2015a; p.43). Furthermore, it is
critical that at-risk populations receive timely and accurate information
about a fire's speed, location and the direction in which it is travelling
[67].
An outcome of the Commission was that Australia adopt a national
bushfire warning system in order to provide further detail about the
days with the greatest risk to life and property. The recommendation
was to split the fire rating that was formerly 'Extreme' into three levels –
Severe, Extreme and Catastrophic or Code Red.3 To address identified
weaknesses in the 'Prepare, stay and defend or leave early' policy, the
Commission recommended that a national 'Prepare. Act. Survive.’
strategy be adopted. Even though messages under the old policy were
similar to that of the abovementioned strategy, the Commission advised
that the leaving option must be emphasised and that 'any policy must
encourage people to adopt the lowest risk option available to them, which is
to leave well before a bushfire arrives in the area' [85]. However, in the
event that people decide to stay despite the dangers, core messages
must stress the significant levels of preparedness required to success-
fully defend a property in a fire event [12].
The Commission also recommended significant improvements to
risk communication, education and warnings because many people who
died were: taken by surprise (unaware of the level of the warnings);
overcome by the ferocity of the fire because they did not adequately
3 ‘Code Red’ is used in Victoria, and all other states and territories use the rating of
‘Catastrophic’, see for example: http://www.cfa.vic.gov.au/warnings-restrictions/about-
fire-danger-ratings/.
https://www.rfs.nsw.gov.au/plan-and-prepare/fire-danger-ratings.
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understand what the fire danger levels meant for them; and, unaware of
the high risk [84]. In response, the Fire Danger Rating System was re-
viewed and a National Framework for Scaled Advice and Warnings to
the Community was developed and agreed upon by all states and ter-
ritories [1]. As well as the amended Fire Danger Ratings, three levels of
warnings with associated actions – Advice; Watch and Act; and,
Emergency Warning - was adopted, stressing that people should never
wait for an official warning before leaving and that a fire may start
rapidly, threatening communities within minutes.
Despite these efforts, however, studies undertaken across multiple
States and Territories since its inception reveal continued issues. For
example, McLennan et al. [69] found that people impacted by bushfire
in New South Wales, Tasmania and Western Australia during
2011–2014 had believed they were not at risk, were unprepared, did
not proactively evacuate based on predicted bushfire weather and,
adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach. Furthermore, Haynes and Bird [50]
discovered that local residents who were part of the Community Fire
Units during the 2013 Blue Mountains bushfires did not know when it
was safe to stay and defend or when to evacuate.
Mackie [63] found that people felt they were less at risk (and
therefore often ignored warnings) if they had experienced a fire pre-
viously and survived, or had been warned over a long period of time
about a potential bushfires that then did not happen at all, or in the way
it was predicted. This ‘prolonged threat’ in specific contexts can set up a
warning fatigue of sorts. Conversely, with rapid onset fires, the per-
ceived likelihood of the threat is higher, as is the perceived level of
danger resulting in higher vigilance and heeding of warnings.
To combat these failings, a new and improved National Fire Danger
Rating System is currently being developed for Australia with aim to
‘improve community awareness of risk exposure, provide greater scientific
accuracy behind decisions, advice and warnings and give communities
greater confidence in the information being provided’ [4]. As an initial step,
a Fire Behaviour Index prototype is being trialled over the 2017/18-
bushfire season. Following this, dedicated social research will be un-
dertaken to:
• understand community thinking about fire danger ratings, including
triggers for response, i.e. what they know, what they think they should
do, what they’ve experienced
• determine community vulnerability in relation to fire danger ratings e.g.
is fire risk communicated appropriately to the public, are the channels for
communicating risk to the public appropriate (fire danger rating meter,
government websites, official government social media sites), is the
imagery, execution, messaging and tone appropriate, does the fire danger
rating meter prompt the desired behaviour, what are the community
expectations with fire warnings, what messaging and channels are ap-
propriate for vulnerable sections of society (e.g. CALD, people with dis-
ability)?
• provide guidance on key messaging that enacts sustained change and
appropriate behaviour, including best messaging for vulnerable sections
of society
• detail what enhancements need to be made from current fire danger
rating systems to the new system to better communicate risk and increase
confidence in practitioner decision making, i.e. is it only about changing
the messaging?
• provide a communication model for fire preparedness, including personal
indicators, community indicators and agency indicators
• nationally agreed communication model and messaging for the system;
resulting in clear, consistent and trusted messaging across state/territory
borders, and
• ultimately, reduce loss of life and enforce sustained, appropriate com-
munity behaviour during fire events ([81]; p.4).
Fig. 3. Tropical cyclone impacts and threats to the Australian region between 1997 and 2016 [21].
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3.3. Tropical cyclone
The northern tropical regions of Australia is one of the most cyclone
prone areas in the world with communities facing annual risk [19].
Approximately 40 Severe Tropical Cyclones (TC) have impacted Aus-
tralia over the last 20 years (Fig. 3) [21]. Categorised as Category 3, 4
or 5, Severe TC have sustained surface winds of at least 118 kmph and
gusts of or exceeding 165 kmph [17].
Interestingly, Australian cyclones display more erratic paths com-
pared to other parts of world (Fig. 4) [22]. This phenomenon adds
another dimension to the issue of communicating uncertainty with re-
spect to predicting a cyclone's track. Adding to uncertainty, are the
predicted effects of climate change on tropical cyclones. The Climate
Council [30] reports that while TC are likely to become less frequent,
Australia is likely to experience more intense or severe TC resulting in
stronger winds and heavier rainfall. Another projection is that a greater
number of TC may track further south along Australia's east and west
coasts [34]. As this occurs, communities with no prior experience of TC
will be exposed and highly vulnerable. Even without a change in TC
frequency or intensity, growing populations in at-risk regions is in-
creasing our exposure.
The devastation wrecked on Darwin and surrounding regions by
Severe TC Tracy in 1974 influenced the shift from the crisis manage-
ment, response oriented approach towards the disaster risk reduction
paradigm as seen in Australia today [39,48,61]. Although in the im-
mediate decades following Severe TC Tracy, TC disaster management
centred around mitigating impacts of wind damage on the built en-
vironment [61,64]. This is in line with a historical trend, including into
the IDNDR, to concentrate on the physical phenomena of the hazards
themselves and the corresponding emergency response as opposed to
enhancing community awareness of and preparedness for natural
hazards [48,70,73].
Since then, however, the need for community education to enhance
preparedness and response has been highlighted by various studies. For
example, Berry and King [7] showed that households in Far North
Queensland had low perceptions of personal risk and were inadequately
prepared and unwilling to respond to warning messages when a threat
was imminent. These responses can be attributed to a number of fac-
tors, including: a high number of new residents to the area who had
little to no previous experience of tropical cyclones; residents’ pre-
ference to trust their own judgements rather than advice from the
emergency services; and, false perceptions that the topography (i.e.
mountains, rainforest and reef) would provide sufficient protection
from wind damage and storm surge4 [7].
Consistent with household findings, low levels of understanding
relating to the processes of cyclone and storm surge were found among
school aged children from the same area [7]. These results were of
concern, given the frequency of TC in the region (e.g. TC Winifred,
1986; TC Joy, 1990; TC Justin, 1997; TC Rona, 1999; TC Steve, 2000;
TC Larry, 2006; and TC Yasi, 2011). As a direct result of this research,
‘Stormwatchers’ was developed by the Bureau and James Cook Uni-
versity, with the aim to raise awareness and enhance protective actions
among school children and their families [7]. As a 3D interactive web
based game, Stormwatchers is still available and relevant to all children
living in cyclone prone regions across Australia [16].
More rigorous education campaigns targeted at enhancing com-
munity preparedness and response to warnings have also been devel-
oped and implemented by local councils, state governments and the
Fig. 4. TC Rewa 1993: demonstrates the uncertain nature of Tropical Cyclone hazards [13].
4 The increased height in sea levels as tropical cyclones make landfall are known as
storm surges. Storm surges are caused by strong onshore winds and / or reduced atmo-
spheric pressure [18].
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emergency services. The success of these was highlighted during Severe
TC Larry, which approached the coast as a Category 5 system before
being downgraded to Category 4 as it made landfall near Innisfail in
March 2006. In post-impact surveying, King et al. [59] found that the
population responded positively to warnings; they were aware of the
risk and were predisposed to undertake preparedness activities during
the cyclone season, whether or not there was an imminent threat. As a
result, there were no fatalities and very few injuries. However, King
et al. [59] clarified that many respondents had previous experience of
cyclone impacts which may have influenced their willingness to
proactively prepare and heed warning advice.
Despite these positive results, there was a significant number of
small insurance claims, indicating that more targeted community edu-
cation campaigns are needed to enhance household preparedness with
respect to reducing damage to outdoor items ([82]; please note, data
pertains to Severe TC Larry and Yasi combined). Furthermore, there
was criticism towards the communication of warning advice. Many
people received conflicting information from media sources when
compared to the Bureau's warnings, citing that the media were often
broadcasting out-dated information [59]. Obviously, this caused some
confusion and highlighted the critical need for accurate, clear, con-
sistent and timely information, with residents calling for more regular
warnings as the cyclone approached the coast.
There has, however, been many upgrades to the Bureau's Tropical
Cyclone Warning system, including the implementation of the seasonal
and shorter-term outlook, extended TC track map and information,
satellite and radar graphical displays, and enhanced Tropical Cyclone
Advice providing the Watch and Warning messaging. These upgrades
have resulted from a combination of learned experience through con-
tinuous review process, research and improved capability and capacity
development in systems and forecast processes, mostly linked to en-
hanced resourcing [14].
The TC Watch is ‘issued when sustained gale force winds or da-
maging wind gusts associated with a tropical cyclone are expected to
affect coastal communities within 48 h, but not expected within 24 h’
[24]. The Bureau issues a TC Warning when ‘sustained gale force winds
or damaging wind gusts associated with a tropical cyclone are affecting
or is expected to affect coastal and island communities within 24 h’
[24]. Adding detail to the timeframes is the predicted and actual in-
tensity of the cyclone, described in Australia as Category 1–5. This
system has been in place since the 1980s following the identification of
issues surrounding misinterpretations relating to definitions of low
pressure system, TC or Severe TC by sustained mean wind speeds [14].
With improved online services and an increase in the use of social
media, there was a marked difference between Severe TC Larry and Yasi
with respect to the community's ability to access information and the
amount of information available. Severe TC Yasi crossed the Far North
Queensland coast near Mission Beach in February 2011 as a Category 4
system. Despite the uncertainty as to where the cyclone would make
landfall, there were no fatalities but many towns experienced sig-
nificant damage to homes, businesses and property. Due to the size and
magnitude of this system as a large Category 5 cyclone approaching the
coast, there was a huge emphasis from the emergency services and
media alike to enhance community preparedness and response.
Media outlets, however, were suggesting that Severe TC Yasi would
annihilate the Queensland coast, being worse than Severe TC Larry and
Tracy, with the power of four Hiroshima bombs [83]. Understandably,
this created great concern among those in its path as well as those
watching the event unfold from a distance. Woods et al. [100] identi-
fied a sense of hopelessness and helplessness among those at-risk, citing
that much of the fear and panic could have been avoided if media
outlets focused on the facts to motivate people to take action rather
than sensationalising worst-case scenarios. Taylor et al. [83], however,
reported that people turned to community Facebook groups, such as
‘Cyclone Yasi Update’, which incidentally acted as a form of psycho-
logical first aid. Through such groups, people felt a sense of
connectedness, as they received or gave timely and ongoing safety
advice and support, with information personalised for users and re-
flecting the local context [8,83].
Since Yasi, the Bureau has implemented further developments, in-
cluding the dissemination of hourly warnings and an increased social
media presence, with Twitter being the predominant platform.
Furthermore, the Bureau's TC warning information was extended to
MetEYE during the 2015/16 TC season, resulting in publicly available
5-day TC track maps. This enhanced capability allows users to drill
down into their area to extract more detailed localised information
about expected conditions [23].
While significant improvements to observation and forecasting
capability have decreased the scientific uncertainty, levels of un-
certainty remain high among those vulnerable, which in turn, influ-
ences their risk perceptions and interpretations of warnings, as was
evident during Severe TC Marcia. This event approached the Central
Queensland coast, just north of Yeppoon in March 2015 as a Category 5
cyclone. In a post-impact survey, Bird et al. [11] found that many re-
sidents were uncertain of the fact or did not believe that a Category 4 or
5 TC could impact the area where they lived. This lack of perceived risk
led to complacency, with residents and some officials believing, due to
past experiences where warnings had been given but the cyclone did
not impact their region, it would be another ‘near miss’. As a result, the
warnings were interpreted as ‘overrated’ and in many instances, ig-
nored up until a few hours before Severe TC Marcia made landfall – a
time when people should be sheltering in a safe location with their
homes and properties well prepared. Bird et al. [11] also noted there
was confusion with respect to the advice given, as residents were
unaware of the difference between a TC Watch and Warning.
In addition to enhancing public understanding of their own risk in
relation to specific events, TC Watch and Warning advice is also critical
to the emergency services for the dissemination of relevant action ad-
vice based on alert levels. For example, recent recommendations
stemming from a review of cyclone and storm tide5 sheltering ar-
rangements following Severe TC Marcia highlight the critical im-
portance of timely warnings for preparing places of refuge [54]. Based
on the rapidly escalating events of TC Marcia, IGEM [54] outlined the
need to re-examine emergency management guidelines and plans,
based on the Bureau's standard TC Watch and Warning timeframes.
The latest TC Watch and Warnings are broadcast across multiple
channels, including local radio, television, social media, online and via
a recorded message accessed by telephoning a 1300 no. relevant to the
area. Since this information is presented in a single location, such as the
Bureau's national website, BoM [14] recognises the need for national
consistency. Currently, however, each region provides their own dis-
tinct information6 in terms of alert levels and action advice based on the
Bureau's suite of products.
Confusion surrounding warnings and impact messages and how
they related to local circumstances is still apparent, as was evidenced
with the impact of Severe TC Debbie on the Whitsunday Coast in April
2017 [43]. Furthermore, as Severe TC Debbie was a large but relatively
slow-moving system that changed course a number of times, resulting
in the Bureau issuing extensive Watch and Warning zones, people be-
came complacent with their preparations, choosing not to act until the
threat was imminent [43]. Again, media outlets sensationalised the
impending event heightening people's fear and panic before TC Debbie
made landfall. As a result of these factors (and possibly others), only a
small number of respondents chose to evacuate, with people choosing
to shelter in place despite the risk [75]. While IGEM [55] showed that
residents received warning information from a variety of sources during
5 A storm tide is the combined effect of storm surge and astronomical tide [16].
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Severe TC Debbie, the Bureau and the Australian Broadcasting Cor-
poration (ABC) were of critical importance. IGEM [55] recommended
that further opportunities for collaboration should be explored between
these two agencies and local councils with the aim to enhance warning
messages. This would certainly help to address the call for the Bureau to
use less formal language that is more personalised to the local context
[75].
As a result of various impact assessments and community surveys,
the following recommendations were made specifically related to en-
hancing the effectiveness of warnings to the community:
• Analyse factors influencing community decisions to evacuate, alongside a
review of communication and messaging about evacuations.
• Analyse the strengths and limitations of automated messaging and how
this could be improved.
• Examine ways for greater integration of Bureau warnings with state and
local emergency services messaging.
• Examine operationalising the use of Facebook in real-time to warn
communities leading up to and during severe weather events.
• Provide more emphasis in warnings about severe weather impacts fol-
lowing landfall.
• Review the style of language used in warnings, and optimise web design
and social media channels so that messages can be more readily accessed
and understood by local communities.
• Revise advice to households to store more than three days of food and
water given the potential for protracted isolation.
• Provide education to residents to ensure a battery operated radio is part
of their emergency kit as mobile phones cannot be relied upon as the only
means of access to warning information, particularly during extended
power outages [75, p.7].
While the Bureau has made significant progress in enhancing its TC
warning capabilities, it is evident that much work is still needed to
improve community preparedness and response (e.g. see [75]). Events
throughout the last decades highlight the issue of complacency relating
to low perceptions of risk; many of which can be related to mis-
understandings of uncertainty. Complacency also stems from experi-
ence, where people base preparedness and response actions on past
experiences of surviving cyclone impacts of a perceived similar mag-
nitude event [35,59], when in actual fact, it may have been of a lower
category. For example, communities impacted by recent Severe TCs
(e.g. Larry, Yasi, Marcia and Debbie) may believe they have a lived
experience of a Category 4 or 5 Cyclone, but in reality, Category 4 or 5
winds only occurred in specific locations. Beyond that, these events also
highlight the critical link between the Bureau and emergency services
with respect to impact forecasting that informs localised risk-based
warnings.
4. Discussion: application of the Total Warning System Concept
Inquiries over the past decades following major catastrophic events,
both in Australia and internationally have explored warnings failures
where community decisions and actions in response to messages have
not dramatically minimised loss of life, property and suffering.
Warnings are complex; they need to convey a range of information
about impending peril that ultimately supports protective action. The
outcomes of the various reviews and inquiries and associated research
discussed above, together with the implementation of the Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction have sent a clear message - to
enable decisions that support appropriate risk mitigating actions at all
levels of society (policy makers to individuals in households) there is a
need for warnings to be people-centred.
Furthermore, warning messaging should focus on effective com-
munication of risk and the inherent associated uncertainty, in addition
to the likely impact. Throughout the case studies lack of risk perception
is persistently linked to inaction or inadequate action in response to
warnings messages. For many community members, this is not apathy,
nor is it ignorance; it is an active decision that the described risk is not
an issue for them and therefore an often-considered decision not to take
appropriate protective action. Perception by the public that previous
‘near-misses’ were actually false alarms can erode the public's con-
fidence in warnings messages, creating a degree of warning fatigue that
can undermine the veracity of future warnings [63]. Research described
above shows that a biased perception of risk can result from lack of
experience with the hazard in relation to their individual circum-
stances. Vulnerability and exposure to hazard impact is increasing, as
more people and infrastructure are located in hazard prone areas such
as floodplains and along the fire-prone rural-urban fringe. It is also
argued that the impacts of climate change will further expose many
communities to unfamiliar hazards with the changing of hazard re-
gimes, such as the southward migrating Severe TC's [56].
Insufficient action has also been attributed to information in
warnings messages that focuses on the hazard elements and re-
commended defensive or response actions. As stated earlier, warnings
that describe what the weather will be rather than what the weather
will do. Typically, the information that recommends action has not
been designed with a good understanding of what motivates action, due
primarily to limitations in knowledge and research. To communicate
risk that prompts action it is important that the information is under-
stood, believed, trusted and promotes a sense of self-efficacy; the lan-
guage used should not be so dire as to immobilise people through a
sense of fear, panic or hopelessness.
Based on developments in international strategies, national policies,
the successful application of the Total Flood Warning System for flood
related hazards, the social research and the outcomes of inquiries fol-
lowing disasters, an adapted revised version of the Total Warning
System concept (Fig. 5) has been developed. This approach emphasises
and reinforces the ‘human’ (as opposed to the system/technical) ele-
ments of the concept.
Importantly, the revised Total Warning System concept aims to
strengthen the components of dissemination, communication and
adoption of protective actions by considering how they are influenced
by a warning recipient's comprehension, trust and personalisation of
warning information. Post-incident research has shown that people
regularly report not receiving adequate warning, despite an apparent
awareness of the hazardous event via multiple communication channels
(e.g. [28]). Therefore, in the successful dissemination of warnings, it
cannot be assumed that warnings will be recognised as such and un-
derstood and trusted by recipients, or that the risk to an individual or
household is understood, believed and personalised simply because
they have received a warning. These are crucial elements in the deci-
sion making process for effective response to emergency situations and
need to be considered with the development of future impact fore-
casting and risk-based warning systems for Australia.
In order to shift to impact forecasting and risk-based warning ser-
vices, incorporation of risk assessment information that goes beyond
current practices of natural hazard risk modelling, needs to occur at the
forecasting stage (see Fig. 5). While Manual 21 frequently talks about
the need to include impact and risk information for flood warnings [5],
risk assessments do not currently integrate specific (spatial and tem-
poral) hazard forecasts with exposure and vulnerability data at the
community level for any hazard warnings within Australia [77]. From
here, translating forecast information and constructing warning mes-
sages (the message communication stage) to include relevant exposure
and vulnerability intelligence, tailored to meet community expectations
about location, likelihood, and potential impacts, while also using ac-
cessible language, is required. Inquiry findings, notably those relating
to bushfires, found individuals were only receptive to information when
a threat was imminent with further complexities around warning
compliance created by warning fatigue. This provides crucial in-
formation for warning and emergency response agencies as to what
information (uncertainty, impacts and risk, action advice) to include in
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future warning products [63,67,96], as well as issues to target in pre-
season education and preparedness programs.
The role for community education and preparedness is highlighted
in the Review asserting that the success of ‘warnings during an emergency
is highly dependent upon prior efforts to build community preparedness and
resilience’ [40, p.5]. While this key issue is not new, the review fol-
lowing the 2010–2011 Victorian Floods highlighted additional com-
ponents that require further emphasis through the Total Warning
System concept that align with preparedness activities, e.g. under-
standing flood risk, emergency management planning and community
flood education [38]. Improving preparedness and education programs
will require a better understanding by warning agencies of communities
and how to address their needs. Factors that should be considered for
emergency planning, community preparedness and education, warning
message construction and communication and response include land-
use, potential social vulnerabilities and types of populations (e.g. aging,
transient) of at-risk communities.
In addition, warning agencies should have an appreciation about
the importance of social capital among communities and the positive
role it can play in all phases of the risk management process including
preparedness, warning and response [37]. Social capital is often de-
scribed as the invisible threads that hold community networks together.
Family groups usually help each other, but groups of friends and
neighbours extend these networks. The OECD (2001 in [80, p.41])
defines social capital as.: ‘networks, together with shared norms, values
and understandings which facilitate co-operation within or among groups’.
Research has shown that communities with high levels of social capital
are cohesive and this can result in residents banding together to warn
and protect each other and assist each other during responses such as
evacuations [37]. Unlike physical capital, social capital is not depleted
when it is used, rather it is enhanced. If social capital is low and
warning messages aren’t passed on, risk-taking behaviour may result,
e.g. people undertaking dangerous evacuations or ignoring warnings
and driving through floodwater. Programs like the Community Fire
Units in New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory are ex-
cellent examples of emergency services supporting local residents in an
effort to enhance preparedness and response to bushfire threats while
building social capital [10,50].
Uncertainty is inherent in every element of the Total Warning
System. Studies indicate that decision making is improved through
provision of uncertainty in forecasts and warnings, with the most ef-
fective responses resulting when communication of uncertainty is
paired with recommended actions [58]. Broadening the understanding
about the ‘calculability of uncertainty’ beyond probabilistic and asses-
sable terms, ‘social scientists argue that uncertainty is always connected
to an unknown lack of knowledge’ [60, p.292]. Uncertainty can be
present in the physical aspects of the hazard. It also needs to be re-
cognised and addressed within forecast formats [46] language around
forecasts and recommended actions, the source and channel of mes-
sages, interpretation of communication methods (text based, graphical,
numerical prediction) and, personalisation of information e.g., is the
information localised and frequent enough to make an effective deci-
sion.
The presentation of information influences how it will be construed.
Hudson-Doyle et al. [52] showed that the format of probability state-
ments (i.e. numerical or verbal) biases people's understanding of
probability and affects their choices of appropriate action. Verbal
statements of probability convey additional information that frames the
Fig. 5. The Total Warning System concept demonstrates the shift to people-centred warning systems in Australia. This graphic shows at which point in the warning system, risk
information would be incorporated into the systems to then be communicated as potential impacts through the warnings, acknowledging the uncertainty inherent throughout. The
Review and other multi-hazard early warning systems models suggest that warnings will only be truly effective when community preparedness has been undertaken prior to emergency
events. Figure constructed by first author of this paper. Information derived from Manual 21 [5] and the Review [40].
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outcome in either a positive or negative light, e.g. 70% chance of suc-
cess compared to 30% chance of failure, thus further influencing
whether or not people adopt protective strategies [52]. Interestingly,
McClure and Sibley [65] discovered that people were more likely to
adopt protective measures when information was framed in a negative
light.
The delivery of a Total Warning System is clearly the collective
responsibility of a partnership that includes the Bureau, emergency
services, government agencies across all levels, media, local community
organisations, educators, researchers, private sector providers and the
public. The success of the system will depend on the strengths of these
partnerships and the interplay of roles and responsibilities [40]. The
roles and responsibilities of emergency services and local government
within the context of an impact forecasting and risk-based warning
system are centred on the interpretation and dissemination of warnings
about the likely impacts of a hazard to the Australian community.
5. Conclusion
The evidence arising from a range of reports and inquiries relating
to multiple extreme hazard events, is consistent and unanimous. When
confronted with the impact of a major hazard event community safety
and resilience is dependent on an effective warnings system that is
specifically and directly relevant to those at risk, i.e., one that is people-
centred. Ideally it contains information and detail relating to the hazard
together with enough information about likely impact for those in
harms way to make risk-informed decisions about taking defensive
actions; some advice on appropriate actions; and, sources of further
information.
International literature, Australian warnings policy documents and
social research considering the effectiveness of warnings, as discussed
through the various case studies that focussed on flood, fire and tropical
cyclone hazards, clearly indicate the need to move towards a people-
centred, impact forecasting and risk-based warnings system, within a
Total Warnings System concept. This has been acknowledged and
agreed by all partners with a role in community warnings. The shift
towards this and away from hazard and action focussed warnings
messaging is an evolutionary and, in the Australian context, staged
process. It is understood that to successfully develop and implement
such a system is a major undertaking. All the components discussed
above, together with: agreed and well defined roles and responsibilities
among all agencies and sector partners; established warnings and
emergency management legislation and arrangements; strong partner-
ships (often newly-formed in the warnings context); consistency of
warning services; and, inclusion of risk, impact and uncertainty in-
formation, must present and integrated in a Total Warnings System.
Under the direction of the ANZEMC, and with the support of all
Australian governments, policy frameworks, organisational processes
and special arrangements are currently being established through cross-
jurisdictional, multi-agency task-forces and working groups, and for-
malised agreements. Projects that will deliver an enhanced under-
standing and description of vulnerability and risk across the Australian
social landscape, and improve the ability to share and merge hazard
and risk-related information in the production of warnings are being
scoped and supported by a range of Commonwealth and State /
Territory agencies.
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